Verify an authentication credential
Complete the verification step for a previously created authentication credential and issue a session.
For EMAIL_OTP credentials, submit the encryptedOtpBundle produced by HPKE-encrypting {otp_code, public_key} under the otpEncryptionTargetBundle returned from the credential’s registration or re-issued via POST /auth/credentials/{id}/challenge. The server is a pass-through and never sees the plaintext OTP code. On success the response is 202 with a payloadToSign carrying the verificationToken bound to the client’s TEK public key — sign that token with the matching TEK private key, then retry the same request with the full stamp in Grid-Wallet-Signature and the requestId echoed in Request-Id. The signed retry returns 200 with the issued AuthSession. The TEK public key becomes the session API key on successful completion.
In sandbox mode, the EMAIL_OTP flow runs real HPKE end-to-end against a sandbox enclave keypair — clients build a real encryptedOtpBundle against the sandbox otpEncryptionTargetBundle and sign a real verificationToken with their TEK keypair. The only sandbox shortcut is the magic OTP code ("000000") the user “receives” instead of a real email delivery.
For OAUTH credentials, supply a fresh OIDC token (iat must be less than 60 seconds before the request) along with the client-generated public key; this is also the reauthentication path after a prior session expired. The token identity (iss, aud, and sub) must match the OAuth credential being verified. In sandbox, the token’s nonce must equal sha256(clientPublicKey). For PASSKEY credentials, the client completes a WebAuthn assertion (navigator.credentials.get()) against the Grid-issued challenge returned from POST /auth/credentials/{id}/challenge, and submits the resulting assertion with the Request-Id header. The clientPublicKey for PASSKEY credentials is supplied on the challenge call, where it is bound into the pending session-creation request.
On success for OAUTH and PASSKEY, and on the signed retry for EMAIL_OTP, the response contains an AuthSession. For OAUTH and PASSKEY the session signing key is delivered as encryptedSessionSigningKey (HPKE-sealed to the supplied clientPublicKey); for EMAIL_OTP the client already holds the session signing key (the TEK private key it generated) and that field is omitted from the response. The expiresAt timestamp marks when the session expires.
Authorizations
API token authentication using format <api token id>:<api client secret>
Headers
Full API-key stamp built over the prior payloadToSign with the TEK (Target Encryption Key) keypair the client generated for this login. Required on the signed retry that completes an EMAIL_OTP verification. Not used by OAUTH or PASSKEY verification, which complete in a single call.
The requestId returned in a prior 202 response from this endpoint, echoed back exactly here so the server can correlate the signed retry with the issued challenge. Required on the signed retry that completes an EMAIL_OTP verification; must be paired with Grid-Wallet-Signature. For PASSKEY verification, the requestId issued from POST /auth/credentials/{id}/challenge is echoed here instead so the server can correlate the assertion with the pending challenge.
Path Parameters
The id of the authentication credential to verify (the id field of the AuthMethod returned from POST /auth/credentials).
Body
- Email OTP Credential Verify Request
- OAuth Credential Verify Request
- Passkey Credential Verify Request
Verify an email-OTP credential via the secure two-leg flow. The client HPKE-encrypts the OTP code (together with its public key) under the otpEncryptionTargetBundle returned from the credential's registration or POST /auth/credentials/{id}/challenge, submits the result here, and receives 202 with a payloadToSign carrying a verificationToken bound to the client's public key. The client signs that token with the matching private key and retries this request with Grid-Wallet-Signature + Request-Id headers to obtain the session. Plaintext OTP codes are never sent over the wire.
Discriminator value identifying this as an email OTP verification.
EMAIL_OTP HPKE-sealed OTP attempt — the OTP code never reaches Grid in plaintext. The client generates a fresh ephemeral P-256 key pair (the session signing key pair it keeps once login completes), HPKE-encrypts {otp_code, public_key} (the code the user entered plus that key pair's public key) to the key in otpEncryptionTargetBundle, and submits the encrypted result here. The value is the {encappedPublic, ciphertext} JSON an HPKE library produces; the Global Accounts client-keys guide has a worked example.
On success the response is 202 with a payloadToSign carrying a verificationToken bound to the public key sealed in this bundle. Sign that token with the matching private key, then retry this request with the full stamp in Grid-Wallet-Signature and the requestId in Request-Id to complete the flow and receive the session. The client keeps that private key as the session signing key, and its public key becomes the session API key.
"{\"encappedPublic\":\"044f631a2d890bc6668d997ee184e190650d06adf970987568ec641214a00403b73effe1ef406c60a5cde8508a4484567ddb8056fbd493bee614cd727aef02a838\",\"ciphertext\":\"1fa1023390a56539aa48cbb380aa28f544ed5cc04861566bb806e25ba026f14660eaf4140a05b388dd012eaa899759a6a92576cdca8c1b7d12e147bd96cc26ed9f74886794155d8ac5cf0fdc\"}"
Response
Authentication credential verified and session issued
An authentication session on an Embedded Wallet internal account. Returned from GET /auth/sessions (list) and POST /auth/credentials/{id}/verify (on credential verification) or POST /auth/sessions/{id}/refresh (on mid-session refresh). Only session-issuing responses include encryptedSessionSigningKey — it is delivered exactly once at the moment the session is issued and is never returned by the list endpoint.
System-generated unique identifier for the session. Pass this value to DELETE /auth/sessions/{id} to revoke the session before expiresAt. Overrides the id inherited from AuthMethod so this response identifies the session rather than the authenticating credential.
"Session:019542f5-b3e7-1d02-0000-000000000003"
Identifier of the internal account that this credential authenticates.
"InternalAccount:019542f5-b3e7-1d02-0000-000000000002"
The type of authentication credential.
OAUTH: OpenID Connect (OIDC) token issued by an identity provider such as Google or Apple.EMAIL_OTP: A one-time password delivered to the user's email address.PASSKEY: A WebAuthn passkey bound to the user's device.
OAUTH, EMAIL_OTP, PASSKEY Human-readable identifier for this credential. For EMAIL_OTP credentials this is the email address; for OAUTH credentials it is typically the email claim from the OIDC token; for PASSKEY credentials it is the validated nickname provided at registration time.
"example@lightspark.com"
Creation timestamp.
"2026-04-08T15:30:01Z"
Last update timestamp.
"2026-04-08T15:35:00Z"
Timestamp after which the session is no longer valid and the encryptedSessionSigningKey must not be used to sign further requests.
"2026-04-09T15:30:01Z"
Base64url-encoded WebAuthn credential identifier for this passkey. Present only for PASSKEY authentication credentials. Corresponds to PublicKeyCredential.rawId; pass this value as allowCredentials[].id when requesting a passkey assertion for this auth method.
"KEbWNCc7NgaYnUyrNeFGX9_3Y-8oJ3KwzjnaiD1d1LVTxR7v3CaKfCz2Vy_g_MHSh7yJ8yL0Pxg6jo_o0hYiew"
HPKE-encrypted session signing key, sealed to the clientPublicKey supplied on the verification or refresh request. Encoded as a base58check string: the decoded payload is a 33-byte compressed P-256 encapsulated public key followed by AES-256-GCM ciphertext. The client decrypts this key with its private key and uses it to sign subsequent Embedded Wallet requests until expiresAt.
Returned only by session-issuing responses for OAUTH and PASSKEY credentials. EMAIL_OTP sessions omit this field — the client generates a TEK keypair before verification and retains the private key throughout, so the server has nothing to deliver. Always omitted from list responses (GET /auth/sessions) since Grid does not retain the plaintext key after the client has decrypted it.
"w99a5xV6A75TfoAUkZn869fVyDYvgVsKrawMALZXmrauZd8hEv66EkPU1Z42CUaHESQjcA5bqd8dynTGBMLWB9ewtXWPEVbZvocB4Tw2K1vQVp7uwjf"